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Abstract  
 This article sets out an analytical framework of differentiation derived 
from Sociology and Anthropology and argues that it can and should be applied 
to International Relations (IR) theory. Differentiation is about how to 
distinguish and analyse the components that make up any social whole: are all 
the components essentially the same, or are they distinguishable by status or 
function? We argue that this approach provides a framing for IR theory that is 
more general and integrative than narrower theories derived from Economics or 
Political Science. We show why this set of ideas has so far not been given much 
consideration within IR, and how and why the one encounter between IR and 
Sociology that might have changed this – Waltz’s transposition of anarchy and 
functional differentiation from Durkheim – failed to do so. We set out in some 
detail how differentiation theory bears on the subject matter of IR arguing that 
this set of ideas offers new ways of looking not only at the understanding of 
structure in IR, but also at structural change and world history. We argue that 
differentiation holds out to IR a major possibility for theoretical development. 
What is handed on from Anthropology and Sociology is mainly designed for 
smaller and simpler subject matters than that of IR. In adapting differentiation 
theory to its more complex, layered subject matter, IR can develop it into 
something new and more powerful for social theory as a whole.  
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Introduction 
 
 Except for a quite old debate around Waltz, the term ‘differentiation’ is 
rarely heard in mainstream discussions of International Relations (IR) theory, 
yet for Sociology and Anthropology it is a foundational idea for how they 
theorize the social world. Differentiation is about how to distinguish and 
analyse the components that make up any social whole: are all the components 
essentially the same, or are they distinguishable by status, capability or 
function? That this way of thinking resonates with IR is evident from terms 
such as ‘like-units’, ‘sovereign equality’, ‘hegemony’, ‘great powers’, ‘empires’ 
and suchlike. Yet because IR has drawn its main lines of theorizing from 
Political Science and Economics, where differentiation does not feature 
explicitly, the concept has not influenced how IR conceives of its own 
theoretical enterprise. Those two disciplines are already narrowly specialized 
because they are founded on the assumption that a functional differentiation 
separating out specific ‘political’ and ‘economic’ domains, or sectors, of 
activity has already occurred. Some people like to think of IR simply as 
‘International Politics’ (the macro-side of Political Science), in which case the 
single sector framing leaves some, but not much, room for differentiation. We 
think that Anthropology and Sociology are closer in form to IR than Political 
Science and Economics because like IR they address the human condition in 
broader terms that range across several sectors. That IR shares this multi-
sectoral view with Anthropology and Sociology is shown by the prominence 
within it of terms such as ‘international society’, ‘world society’, ‘international 
political economy’, ‘international law’, ‘globalization’ and the ‘global 
environment’. This similarity of perspective suggests that a differentiation 
approach might have something to contribute to IR. 
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 In what follows we have three specific aims: 
1. To extract a set of concepts about differentiation, and a taxonomy, from 
Sociology and Anthropology, and to show how these provide a coherent 
framing for the notoriously fragmented debates about IR theory; 
2. To identify, and up to a point explore, some of the new analytical leverage 
that this framing creates for thinking about IR generally and system structure 
in particular; and 
3. To begin thinking about how the levels of analysis issue, which is a strong 
feature of IR theory, plays into the intellectual apparatus of differentiation, 
and vice versa.  
Our general aim is to make a prima facie case that differentiation could make a 
major contribution to IR theory, and that by adapting it for this purpose, IR 
might itself make a more significant contribution to social theory than it has 
done so far. The next section sets out differentiation as an approach to social 
theory. Section 3 concentrates particularly on the story of Waltz and functional 
differentiation. The debates around Waltz have been the main exploration of 
differentiation in IR, and a critique of Waltz’s transposition of functional 
differentation from Sociology is an instructive way of showing what was 
missed, why, and how to do the job better. Section 4 looks forward, and 
outlines the principal ways in which we think differentiation theory could be 
put to work in IR, particularly its utility for understanding structural change, 
and therefore the evolution of international systems and societies.  
 
Differentiation 
 
 Anthropology and Sociology both make extensive use of differentiation in 
their theories, but they do so in ways adapted to their particular subject matter. 
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Together, these disciplines study the forms, processes and structures of human 
social organization ranging from small-scale bands and tribes up to large scale 
societies. The division of labour between these two disciplines is complex, and 
need not concern us here. What is of interest is that both, like IR, study the 
social arrangements of humankind in a systemic way across a wide range of 
both scales and sectors, and that they make extensive use of the concept of 
differentiation to do so. It is not our purpose here to go into the details of their 
inner debates. We want only to extract the essentials of the differentiation 
approach so that we can see how these might apply to the particular subject 
matter of IR, and what the problems and benefits of such a transposition of 
concept across disciplines might be. We are particularly conscious that the main 
(not the only) focus in Anthropology and Sociology is on systems and societies 
composed of individual people, whereas the main (not the only) focus in IR is 
on systems and societies composed of units that are themselves systems and 
societies of individuals (systems of systems, or second order societies). One key 
question is therefore what difference does it make to think in terms of 
differentiation in the two-level realm of IR? 
 As we see it, there are five elements of differentiation that might usefully 
be transposed to thinking about IR: 
•  A taxonomy by which different types of social structure can be classified 
according to their dominant principle of differentiation. 
•  A sense of history, closely attached to the taxonomy, in which there is a 
general tendency for the simpler forms to come earlier, and the more 
complex ones to grow out of them.  
•  Ideas about the driving forces that push the movement from 
smaller/simpler to larger/more complex social forms. 
•  Ideas about what holds social forms together, especially as they become 
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larger and more diversified internally. 
•  A tension as to whether what is being studied is the emergence of social 
form itself (more the case in Anthropology), or whether the existence of a 
social form – ‘society’ – is taken as given, and what is to be studied are 
the internal dynamics of what holds it together (more the case in 
Sociology).  
We need briefly to explain each of these elements and to suggest how they 
relate to IR. 
 Taxonomy is not currently fashionable in IR, but we think that it is 
foundational to all theory and therefore intrinsically important. Flawed 
taxonomy generates flawed theory. The taxonomy of differentiation can vary 
from author to author, but Luhmann (1982: 232-8; 1990: 423-5) is a useful 
guide because he approaches the matter in terms of basic principles, noting 
(1982: 232) that ‘only a few forms of differentiation have been developed’: 
segmentary, stratificatory and functional. We agree that all other variants vary 
within these three principles, and we are attracted by the idea that these three 
potentially provide not just a unifying vocabulary, but potentially some 
theoretical input as well, to the notoriously fragmented domain of IR theory. 
• Segmentary (or egalitarian) differentiation is where every social 
subsystem is the equal of, and functionally similar to every other social 
subsystem. In Anthropology and Sociology this points to families, bands, 
clans and tribes. In IR it points to anarchic systems of states as ‘like 
units’. Segmentation is the simplest form of social differentiation, though 
that does not mean that societies of this type are in any general sense 
simple. Like all human social constructs they are capable of great 
elaboration and complexity. As Durkheim (1968: 79-80, 84-5, 105-7) 
argues it, such ‘mechanical’ societies are held together, indeed defined 
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by, a collective conscience, which is ‘the totality of beliefs and 
sentiments common to average citizens of the same society’. This totality, 
which today we would discuss as ‘identity’, transcends the individuals 
that compose it and so operates as an independent structure across space 
and time. A segmentary form of differentiation is the one most prone to 
be organized in terms of territorial delimitations, although this is not 
necessarily so.  
• Stratificatory differentiation is where some persons or groups raise 
themselves above others, creating a hierarchical social order. 
Stratificatory differentiation covers a wide range of possibilities and can 
be further subdivided into rank and class forms distinguished by whether 
or not there is significant inequality not just in status (rank), but in access 
to basic resources (class). In Anthropology and Sociology this points to 
feudal or caste or aristocratic or military social orders, though it can also 
be about the conquest and absorption of some units by others (Johnson 
and Earle, 2000: 35). As this suggests, stratification can occur in many 
dimensions: coercive capability, access to resources, authority, status. In 
IR it points to the many forms of hierarchy: conquest and empire, 
hegemony, a privileged position for great powers, and a division of the 
world into core and periphery1, or first and third worlds.2 Collective 
conscience applies here too, but with the additional element that 
stratification must be accepted as legitimate. However, the lower the 
degree of legitimacy, the higher the necessity to maintain a stratified 
order by force.3 
• Functional differentiation is where the subsystems are defined by the 
coherence of particular types of activity and their differentiation from 
other types of activity, and these differences do not stem simply from 
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rank. The idea was initially drawn from biological metaphors about the 
different subsystems that compose living organisms (Durkheim, 1968: 
41, 125, 127, 271). Functional differentiation is mainly studied in 
Sociology where it is generally thought of as the essential characteristic 
of modernity. It is closely related to the idea of a division of labour in the 
sense understood by economists, but when applied to society as a whole 
it points to its increasing division into legal, political, military, economic, 
scientific, religious and suchlike distinct and specialised subsystems or 
sectors of activity, often with distinctive institutions and actors. 
Durkheim (1968: 56, 64-5, 267, 274) argues that through a logic of 
interdependence and non-competition the functional differentiation of a 
division of labour itself generates a new form or social solidarity which 
he labels ‘organic’. The practice of thinking in terms of functionally 
differentiated sectors is not uncommon (See Braudel,1985: 17; 
Mann,1986: ch. 1). In IR functional differentiation points, inter alia, to 
international political economy (IPE), international law, world (or global 
civil) society, transnational actors, and the debates about 
deterritorialization, a set of elements that have so far lacked a unifying 
concept in IR theory debates (other than the extremely loose one of 
‘globalization’).  
 The sense of history in differentiation involves an idea of evolution in 
which more complex forms grow out of the simpler ones that precede them: 
segmentary hunter-gatherer bands precede the stratified city states and empires 
of ancient and classical times, which precede the functionally differentiated 
societies characteristic of modernity (Luhmann, 1990: 423ff; see also 
Durkheim, 1968: 256, 277, 283). In this view, segmentary, stratificatory and 
functional differentiation form a sequence in that the higher tiers depend for 
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their existence on having developed out of, and overcome, the one that came 
before. The sequence is thus both empirical (roughly corresponding to the 
general pattern of human history) and qualitative (from simpler forms of 
differentiation to more complex ones). Although such evolution is common, it 
is certainly not inevitable. Specific societies can end up in stasis, or can revert 
back to simpler types. Evolution does not mean that higher forms of 
differentiation totally eliminate those below them. The logic is structural: social 
orders are characterized by the co-presence of different forms of differentiation, 
the key question being which form is dominant in shaping the social structure 
as a whole (Durkheim, 1968: 260-61; Luhmann, 1982: 242-5). This co-presence 
framing is immediately apparent in contemporary society, where it is easy to 
identify all three types of differentiation in simultaneous operation. It puts into 
context the debates in IR about the nature and direction of the contemporary 
international system which seems to contain elements of all three forms, with 
the dominant segmentary one (territorial states, sovereign equality, anarchy) 
being questioned by both stratificatory elements (the return of empire, 
hegemony, core-periphery) and functional ones (globalization, 
deterritorialization, transnational actors, an increasingly autonomous global 
economy). More generally, it provides an overall framing for thinking about not 
just how states evolve, but about how the whole international system/society 
has developed, and what the relationship between these two levels might be 
both historically and now. 
 Underlying this sense of history are theories about the driving forces that 
push societies from simpler to more complex forms of differentiation. One of 
these is Durkheim’s idea of dynamic density as the driving force pushing 
societies from a segmentary to a functionally differentiated form (Durkheim, 
1968; 257-64; Barkdull, 1995: 669-74). Although Larkins (1994: 249) 
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dismisses dynamic density as a weak concept, it is in fact central to Durkheim’s 
whole argument. He hypothesised that ‘the division of labor varies in direct 
ratio with the volume and density of societies, and, if it progresses in a 
continuous manner in the course of social development, it is because societies 
become regularly denser and generally more voluminous….[T]he growth and 
condensation of societies…necessitate a greater division of labour….it is its 
determining cause.’(Durkheim, 1968: 262). This is a materialist theory claiming 
that as the numbers of people in a society increases, contact and interaction also 
increase, and the social structure moves from simple and segmentary to a more 
complex division of labour. As this movement occurs, the basis of social 
solidarity automatically shifts from mechanical (collective consciousness) to 
organic (functional differentiation). 
 This type of thinking is particularly well developed in Anthropology 
which has many cases of failure (social collapse) to consider, as well as 
evolutionary successes that move up the differentiation ladder. Johnson and 
Earle (2000: 14-37) posit population growth and technological evolution 
interacting with each other within the context of environmental constraints, as 
the ‘primary engine’ of social evolution. Larger and more technologically 
capable societies make more demands on their environments, and when 
environmental limits are reached, this can lead to stasis or collapse (Diamond, 
2005; Wright, 2004). The basic story, however, is one of evolutionary increase 
in size and complexity. As size increases, complexity and differentiation 
become necessary to deal with collective problems such as food storage, 
defence, trade and capital investment that are beyond the capacity of smaller, 
simpler units. This in turn drives societies up the differentiation ladder from 
segmentary through stratificatory to functional differentiation in ‘an iterative 
process of social evolution’ (Johnson and Earle, 2000: 29). It is not difficult to 
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see how theorizing along these lines could be related to IR concerns about 
things ranging from the evolution of international systems/societies, through the 
strategic consequences of population and technological innovation, to whether 
or not humankind is playing its last and greatest game with environmental 
carrying capacity. 
 The last two elements of differentiation theory – what holds social forms 
together; and whether the study of differentiation should be focused on how 
societies emerge, or on how existing societies cohere – are so interwoven that it 
is easiest to consider them together. This is a rather complicated issue which 
has substantive implications for how differentiation theory can be transposed to 
the subject matter of IR. It hinges on the move up to functional differentiation, 
and since that move is mainly in the domain of Sociology, the easiest way to 
explain what is at stake is to look briefly at how the debate unfolded in 
Sociology. We will again simplify, looking only to draw out the essentials 
relevant to IR, and not to attempt a full portrait of the debates in Sociology.  
 Classical Sociology has been largely concerned with the impact of 
modernity on national societies. Modernity has been mainly conceived as the 
shift from stratificatory to functional differentiation. In this framing, society 
was something that existed before functional differentiation became dominant. 
The marker for society was the existence of shared beliefs and sentiments, 
Durkheim’s collective conscience, that both gave social cohesion to a particular 
group of people and differentiated them from other cultures. This concept of 
society leaned strongly towards Gemeinschaft (community), understanding it as 
something evolved, historic, and old. From that starting point, the problem was 
how the cohesion of such societies could survive the ever more pervasive 
impact of modernity as functional differentiation. What unites the classical 
works of Sociology, ranging from Herbert Spencer (1968) and Emile Durkheim 
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(1968), through Georg Simmel (1908) and Max Weber (1968), to Talcott 
Parsons (1961, 1967) and Niklas Luhmann (1997), is that modernization and 
the evolution of society in general are seen in terms of a continuing 
specialization of tasks and the division of labour in society. Although ‘not all 
social change is differentiation’ (Alexander, 1990: 1), the ‘differentiation of 
tasks in society – or the division of labour – is a central focus of sociology’ 
(Holmwood, 2006: 142). The puzzle was whether the increasingly elaborate 
division of labour in modern societies would destroy the traditional 
(mechanical, identity) cohesion that defined what society was, or would itself 
serve as the basis for a new type of (organic) social whole that was defined by 
the interdependence of its division of labour.  
  The responses to this puzzle went in two directions: decomposition and 
emergence. Some saw functional differentiation to mean a process of a 
decomposition of society in which the stability of a pre-existing cultural entity 
is compromised by an evolution that decomposes it into ever more specialized 
units, subsystems, and roles. If society was viewed as community and shared 
culture (Gemeinschaft), then functional differentiation was corrosive. The 
importance of the organic, evolved identity in Sociology underpinned the 
concerns of those such as Tönnies (1887) and Gellner (1988: 61) who worried 
about the loss of Gemeinschaft in the transition to modernity and Gesellschaft 
(society as something instrumental, contractual and constructed). Crucial to this 
view is an account of what it is in the first place that makes society hang 
together as a whole despite ongoing processes of differentiation. This social 
glue is variously referred to as ‘collective conscience’ (Durkheim), a ‘societal 
community’ (Parsons), or a ‘lifeworld’ (Habermas), all of which point to the 
realm of shared values and norms. These cultural bonds act as the counterforce 
to the centrifugal tendencies of functional differentiation that were perhaps 
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most graphically captured by Marx’s idea of class war.  
 Others, most notably Weber and later Luhmann saw functional 
differentiation as a process of emergence (see Schimank and Volkmann, 1999: 
8ff). In other words, it is the processes of functional differentiation itself – the 
emergence of recognisably different spheres of politics, law, economics, 
religion etc. – which account for the existence of society as a ‘social whole’ in 
the first place (see Nassehi, 2004). If society was viewed as Gesellschaft, then 
functional differentiation was integral to its existence, not antagonistic to it. 
Durkheim is in the middle, seeing decomposition as a necessary condition for 
emergence. Functional differentiation then does not mean that an integrated 
whole is somehow decomposed, but rather that as society evolves into 
functional differentiation it undergoes a process of newly emerging structures 
and systems. These systems build ‘global accounts’ of the world, i.e. the 
functionally differentiated political system reconstructs the world in terms of 
power, the legal system reconstructs the world in terms of legal/illegal, the 
scientific system in terms of true/false, etc. Luhmann completes this turn by 
asserting that society (which for him cannot be anything but world society) can 
only appear as such because it is internally differentiated, i.e. there is no 
‘integrating’ force in addition to the form of functional differentiation itself. 
 Several points of relevance to transposing differentiation theory into IR 
emerge from these debates in Sociology: 
• The decomposition view has little relevance for IR because IR does not start 
from the assumption that any sort of international society is already in 
existence. IR is very much in the emergence camp, with international society 
not taken as given, but having to be constructed. Most of the IR mainstream 
starts from the assumption that the system of states is only minimally a 
society (in the recognition of sovereign equality in a segmentary/anarchic 
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structure), and mainly a stratified hierarchical system in which order rests on 
the use of force by great powers. 
• Yet while the decomposition view does not fit well with IR, its idea of 
society as community, involving shared values and identity, is prominent in 
IR. The English school’s whole idea of international society is based on 
shared norms, rules and institutions, and many constructivists and thinkers 
about global civil society also focus on the development of shared norms as 
the key to social theory approaches to IR – most obviously democratic peace 
theory. 
• Despite the better fit for IR of the emergence view, there has as yet been 
little explicit thinking in IR about social structure as a property of functional 
differentiation. Some elements of IPE, world society, and globalization 
thinking lean this way implicitly, but since mainstream IR has hardly 
engaged with functional differentiation, the path to this type of thinking 
remains largely unexplored. 
 We conclude that both lines of thinking about society – whether as shared 
culture and values, or as a structural property of functional differentiation – are 
relevant to IR. We also conclude that the emergence view of society fits well 
with the needs of IR, and that therefore the bad fit with decomposition doesn’t 
matter. Indeed, there is no reason why the shared culture and values view of 
society cannot be compatible with emergence. Here IR is better lined up with 
the anthropological view of differentiation which is more about how societies 
develop and expand. There is no reason why one cannot look at the emergence 
of shared values and culture as an act of social construction. Rather than an 
organic Gemeinschaft being threatened by an instrumental Gesellschaft, the 
reverse is also possible, where the construction and operation of an instrumental 
Gesellschaft paves the way to a shared culture Gemeinschaft. 
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Why IR Theory has not Engaged with Differentiation  
 
 Since differentiation theory seems to offer considerable riches to IR, the 
next question to answer is why mainstream IR has shown so little interest in it. 
Some sociologists have argued for the need to extend the discipline’s purview 
to the international and global realm (Moore, 1966; Smelser, 1997), but nothing 
much has been done. A current mainstream textbook on so-called ‘Global 
Sociology’ (Cohen & Kennedy, 2007) has no index references to any aspect of 
differentiation, nor, indeed, to international society. The works of the Stanford 
school (Meyer et al., 1997) and Niklas Luhmann’s work on ‘world society’ 
(Luhmann, 1997, 2000a) both address ‘world society’, neither is widely read or 
understood within IR. There have been several other sociological approaches to 
IR, which we do not have the space to review. The point is that while most were 
rooted in accounts of differentiation, none of them imported the idea into IR.  
 There is some irony in the fact that mainstream IR’s principal engagment 
with functional differentiation was initiated by Kenneth Waltz, the founding 
father of an approach to IR which is about as far from ‘sociological’ as one 
could get: Neorealism. Although Waltz borrowed some arguments from 
Durkheim, his main inspiration was microeconomics, and his main aim was to 
build a materialist, not a social theory of international politics. Thus the one 
serious engagement with differentiation in IR was developed in such a way as 
to close off the main lines of theoretical significance. 
 Waltz’s theory is entirely one of international politics. Using Durkheim for 
authority, and levels of analysis as a weapon, Waltz first confines functional 
differentiation to the functions of government (essentially therefore about 
sovereignty). He then adopts a definition that relegates this exclusively political 
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functional differentiation to hierarchic systems, and banishes it from anarchic 
ones (Waltz, 1979: 104, 115, 197; 1986: 323-30; 2004: 98-9). This move 
privileges territoriality along the lines of segmentary differentiation: the ‘like 
units’ on which Waltz (1979: 97) builds his vision of anarchic structure. The 
prominence Waltz accords to the absence of functional differentiation in the 
international system of states reinforces Parson’s (1961: 241) view of the 
international domain as a ‘social system’, not developed enough to be a proper 
society. By removing the social element, Waltz reduces the status of the whole 
to a mere system (Larkins, 1994, 249-53; Barkdull, 1995: 674-6). By driving 
functional differentiation exclusively into domestic politics, Waltz’s theory 
explicitly removes it from IR theory. This move was challenged by Ruggie 
(1983. See also Barkdull, 1995; Buzan and Little, 1996, 2000), but the IR 
debate about functional differentiation nonetheless took place entirely within 
the political sector, closing the door on its more general meaning. 
 Waltz and Ruggie also contested over the role of another Durkheim 
concept, dynamic density, and the role of increasing social interaction in 
generating structural change in society. As we showed above, dynamic density 
is a materialist theory of the driving forces that push development up the ladder 
of differentiation. As Ruggie, Barkdull, and Buzan and Little all see it, by 
importing Durkheim’s model Waltz necessarily brought with it the logic that a 
rising volume and intensity of social interaction must inevitably drive society 
from mechanical/segmentary/simple (like units) to organic/functionally 
differentiated/complex. If dynamic density is increasing within the international 
domain, as it unarguably is, then it undermines one of the key elements in 
Waltz’s theory: that anarchy (i.e. a mechanical/segmentary/simple social 
structure) is a stable and self-reproducing form. Durkheim’s theory of dynamic 
density opens Waltz’s scheme to the arguments of interdependence theorists 
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and globalizationists that the rapid increase in material density and social 
volume is the defining feature of the contemporary international system. That 
logic points to the instability of anarchic structure, opening the door to those 
such as Milner (1991) and Cerny (1993, 1995a, 1995b, 2000) who want to 
argue that the international system is indeed transforming from a simple 
anarchy with no functional differentiation into at least the beginnings of a 
division of labour in which functional differentiation in both Waltz’s narrow 
sense, and the wider one of Sociology, is becoming more conspicuous. This 
threatens not only the stability of Waltz’s anarchy, but also his confinement of 
functional differentiation to the political sphere.  
 Although both Waltz (2004: 99) and Ruggie (1983: 262) noted the 
transposition of Durkheim’s structural logic from the unit level to the 
international system level, there was no consideration of whether this might be 
problematic. Waltz (2004: 99) simply takes Durkheim’s distinction between 
mechanical (segmentary) and organic (functionally differentiated) societies and 
transposes it directly, saying that mechanical ones represent ‘the anarchic order 
of international politics’ and organic ones ‘the hierarchic order of domestic 
politics’ (Barkdull, 1995: 674-6). Waltz (2004: 99) also follows Durkheim’s 
analysis that structural transformation from mechanical to organic is a conflict-
laden process which establishes forms of stratification in addition to functional 
differentiation. Here the stronger units in the mechanical society impose a 
division of labour (e.g. the core-periphery of the world economy) on the weaker 
ones thus imposing both hierarchy and functional differentiation.  
 To gain some perspective on this transposition it is useful to return to the 
differentiation taxonomy set out earlier: segmentary, stratificatory and 
functional. Durkheim’s mechanical society transposes pretty neatly onto 
segmentary, but his organic one is either effectively a jump to functional 
 
 
 
18 
differentiation (given Durkheim’s interest in the division of labour), or a 
conflation of stratificatory and functional differentiation. Either way, the 
difference between Durkheim’s dyad and the triad of differentiation matters 
when it comes to Waltz’s transposition. Because Waltz has narrowed the 
meaning of functional differentiation down into the purely political (functions 
of government, sovereignty), his reading of Durkheim can only go from 
segmentary to stratificatory. Being purely political, Waltz’s ‘functional 
differentiation’ is not, and cannot be, functional differentiation in the 
sociological meaning because only one sector – politics – is in play. It can only 
be stratificatory differentiation, a point underlined by Waltz’s focus on great 
powers and polarity. In this sense Waltz’s political understanding of ‘functional 
differentiation’ leads exactly to the political differentiation within anarchy that 
several IR authors have developed: Ruggie (1983, 1993) in his thinking about 
the medieval system and the EU; Watson (1990, 1992) in his pendulum theory 
of international order; and Buzan and Little (1996; 2000) about political 
differentiation in world history from empires, city-states and barbarians to the 
centre-periphery structure of European colonialism. Stratificatory 
differentiation, with its emphasis on unequal status, opens up precisely the 
blurring of anarchy and hierarchy that Waltz was so keen to avoid.   
 Although it opens up some interesting insights, this repositioning of 
Waltz still leaves unanswered the legitimacy of the whole transposition of 
Durkheim to the international system in the first place. The near silence on this 
point is deeply ironic given that it is fundamentally a question about levels of 
analysis, an issue on which IR theory is well primed, and about which Waltz is 
the undisputed king. Yet in this instance Waltz simply assumes that the basic 
structural idea will apply regardless of level. How tenable is this assumption? 
The obvious difficulty with it is that the segmentary/mechanical form is lifted 
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from a sociological context in which Durkheim understood it as a type of 
society integrated by a shared identity (Larkins, 1994: 252), and moved to an IR 
one in which it is understood as a mere system, operating mechanically as an 
anarchic struggle for power/survival without any integrating social content. 
Durkheim’s label of mechanical facilitates Waltz’s dumping of the shared 
identity element, and thus society, but as the more neutral label segmentary 
underlines, the segmentary/mechanical form of differentiation still has to be 
understood as a type of society. That is to say it must possess social cohesion 
and some sense of being a whole. Durkheim’s linking of mechanical solidarity 
with repressive sanctions against challengers to the collective conscience did 
not suggest that this social element was thin in mechanical societies (Durkheim, 
1968: 84-5, 106).  
 Because the shift from international system to international society is 
important both as an evolutionary step and as a basic conceptualisation, Waltz’s 
transposition across levels from domestic society to the international system is 
in trouble. Durkheim’s mechanical/segmentary logic presupposes a social 
context, whereas Waltz’s anarchic system one precisely does not. This problem, 
as Barkdull (1995: 674) argues, largely stems from Waltz’ confusion about ‘the 
relationship between anarchy and hierarchy on the one hand and mechanical 
and organic solidarity on the other’. It could thus be argued that reading 
Durkheim in an international context would actually support the idea that the 
international system, even under the ‘weak’ condition of mechanical solidarity, 
is already a social context, i.e. an international society, and not an asocial 
international system. Barkdull (1995: 677) rightly in our view, goes so far as to 
say that Waltz must accept international society if he wants to claim 
Durkheim’s authority for his theory.  
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 By transposing from Durkheim, Waltz thus offers two rich gifts to his 
critics. The first is that if the segmentary analogy is carried across from the 
domestic to the international level, then the holistic element of society must be 
carried with it as well. Via Durkheim, Waltz opens the door to both 
international and world society, validating the foundations not just of the 
English school but also of many constructivists. This in turn raises the question 
of how ideas about society can be transposed from the domestic realm to the 
international one. In Sociology, it is mostly individuals who are the constitutive 
elements of society, and even in segmentary societies it is individuals that carry 
the collective conscience that unites the ‘like units’. Although some of IR 
theory is reductionist in this way, much of it is based on methodological 
collectivism, in which states and other collective entities are treated as actors It 
is far from clear how concepts like Durkheim’s collective conscience can be 
carried across from first-order societies (individuals as members) to second-
order ones (collective actors as members). In interstate society it is the 
collective ‘like units’ of the society (states) that share identity (sovereign 
equality, or at a higher level, democracy), not necessarily the individual human 
beings within them. This distinctive quality of international society does not as 
far as we can see, have any clear analogues in sociological theory.  
 The second gift, as already hinted above, is that Waltz cannot really get 
away with squeezing everything out of Durkheim’s model except politics. For 
better or worse, a differentiation approach brings the whole spectrum of human 
activity with it, not just politics, but economics, law, religion and all. Though 
neither uses the language of functional differentiation, this validates both 
English school solidarists, who deal with human rights and economic issues, 
and globalizationists, whose mode of analysis is sufficiently multi-faceted that 
it begins to close the gap between how networks of complex interdependence 
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work in the international system, and functional differentiation as understood 
by sociologists. By using Durkheim, Waltz undermines his own narrowing to 
the political, and opens the way for those wanting to take a much wider view of 
what comprises an international system/society, and therefore of what IR is 
actually about.  
 We can see, therefore, that both Waltz and much of the debate around 
him, constitute a wrong turn in relation to the discussion of functional 
differentiation in IR. By reducing functional differentiation to something within 
politics only, and then confining it to the unit level, Waltz and those who 
followed his lead basically ended up using the terminology of functional 
differentiation to talk about the difference between segmentary (anarchic) and 
stratificatory (hierarchic) systems. This wrong turn, while not quite a dead-end, 
has pre-empted a proper discussion of functional differentiation in IR by 
stealing its clothes. IR readings of Waltz’ work have mainly followed his 
reduction of functional differentiation to a ‘within politics’ meaning. This 
means that the repeated calls to roll back Waltz’s closure of functional 
differentiation (Ruggie, 1983; Buzan et al., 1993: 238-40; Sørensen, 2000) have 
not addressed the full question. Even some of those IR conceptualizations that 
challenge the idea that international relations can adequately be described in 
terms of an anarchically structured system of states have neglected the issue of 
functional differentiation (World Society Research Group, 2000; Bull, 1977; 
Buzan, 2004).  
 The wrong turn initiated by Waltz does not, however, stand in the way of 
IR now taking up the full meaning of differentiation. Despite the hegemony of 
Waltz’s narrow interpretation, functional differentiation in its wider meaning 
has been explicitly addressed within IR in a couple of places marginal to the 
mainstream. One of these is in IR readings of the Luhmannian concept of world 
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society (Albert and Hilkermeier, 2004). Another is the work of Cerny who 
follows Waltz’s link to Durkheim in order to critique Neorealism. Cerny (1993: 
36-7) argues that the international system is moving from simple (segmentary) 
to complex (functional) differentiation. These works point the way to the idea 
that Waltz’s use of Durkheim might open the door to a much wider use of 
differentiation in IR. How might mainstream IR pursue a theoretical 
development along these lines? 
 
Looking Forward: Differentiation as IR Theory 
 
 In this section we focus on how differentiation fits into IR theory debates, 
and what agendas its adoption would open up. The re-engagement of IR with 
differentiation has to begin with recognition of the three lessons learned from 
the critique of Waltz. First, that the use of differentiation carries with it the 
assumption of society. Second that to confine functional differentiation to the 
political sector takes away most of its useful meaning. Rather than using 
functional differentiation to look inward into the political sector, as Waltz did, 
we need to use it to look outward into the international system/society across 
sectors, and to aim at understanding the whole of which the political sector is 
but one functionally differentiated part.4 And third, that one cannot transpose 
differentiation into IR without thinking hard about the difference made by 
moving from the domestic to the international level of analysis. With these 
lessons in mind, we return to the taxonomy of differentiation, and the analytical 
ideas associated with it, set out at the beginning of this article with a view to 
illustrating in more detail both the issues they raise for IR theory and the 
contributions they might make to it.   
 Perhaps the major contribution of differentiation to IR is that it offers a 
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novel taxonomy for thinking about the structure of both units and systems. 
Taxonomy is foundational to all theory because it sets up what it is that is to be 
understood and/or explained. The taxonomy of differentiation both maps onto 
and enriches the dominant concepts in IR. As we have shown, segmentary maps 
onto anarchic, and stratificatory onto hierarchic. But functional differentiation, 
when properly understood, is both an additional form of structure and a radical 
departure from the anarchy-hierarchy dyad. Unlike other attempts to break away 
from the dominance of the anarchy-hierarchy dyad – Ruggie’s (1983) 
‘heteronomy’, Deudney’s (2007: 48-9) ‘negarchy’ or Watson’s (1990, 1992) 
spectrum of anarchy, hegemony, suzerainty, dominion, empire – functional 
differentiation moves beyond the political sector.5 It opens up a concept of 
structure that embraces rather than denies wider understandings of international 
systems/societies incorporating the whole range of sectors. To get a sense of 
how the adoption of this approach might play into IR thinking it is necessary 
first to think about the transposition problem of moving differentiation from the 
mainly domestic level, to the international system/society level.  
 What difference does it make for applying differentiation concepts that the 
subject matter of IR is mainly at the international system/society level rather 
than at the domestic one? There are two ways of thinking about this question. 
The first is relatively simple: since there are two levels in play in IR, one needs 
to apply the structural questions of differentiation to both, asking not just how 
the individual units are differentiated internally, but also how the international 
system/society as a whole is differentiated. Standard answers to these questions 
might be that the leading units display quite advanced degrees of functional 
differentiation, while the international system remains a mixture of segmentary 
(sovereign equality) and stratificatory (hegemony). Does this difference in the 
dominant mode of differentiation across the levels matter? Does the disjuncture 
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create tension and constitute a driving force for change? Should we expect the 
leading units to project their domestic form of differentiation into the system as 
a whole? This offers an interesting new dimension to the classic problem 
identified by Wight (1966) and Walker (1993) of inside/outside in IR theory. It 
also offers a pathway into setting up a structural analysis for the 
territorialization/deterritorialization problematique in globalization, which can 
be quite nicely framed as a set of tensions among the different types and levels 
of differentiation.  
 The two levels framing of differentiation in IR also means that segmentary 
differentiation itself has to be reconsidered. In Sociology and Anthropology, 
segmentary differentiation represents the simple/primitive end of the 
differentiation spectrum. But IR starts from collective units and works up to 
international systems and societies, and in this perspective segmentary 
differentiation at the system level can become much more sophisticated because 
the ‘like units’ that compose it may themselves have very complex and 
sophisticated modes of differentiation within them. A segmentary 
differentiation based on units that are functionally differentiated internally is 
neither simple nor primitive. A two-level perspective on differentiation along 
these lines points towards second-order societies, where the entities that 
compose international society are not individuals but collective units. This 
framing moves into the terrain of the English school and of constructivists such 
as Wendt, where differentiation offers additional analytical tools for thinking 
about international society. It raises, for example, the question of how the 
different modes of differentiation both within states and at the system level, 
play into the rise, evolution and obsolescence of the institutions of international 
society studied by Holsti (2004). Specifically, if great powers are the key 
generators of such institutions, can one link the nature of their own internal 
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differentiation to the specific types of institutions that they promote and 
support? The suggestive evidence for such a link is strong. Colonialism and 
great power management surely link to stratificatory differentiation, sovereign 
equality and nationalism to segmentary differentiation, and the market and 
international law to functional differentiation. 
 Pushing this line of thought even further leads to the second way of 
responding to the levels problem. If the international system level is 
segmentary, or even stratificatory, then it is still possible to stay within a state-
centric model of international system/society. In IR terms, segmentary 
differentiation embodies the central place that territoriality occupies in much 
thinking about IR – and not just in IR: as Scholte (2000: 56-61) points out, 
‘methodological territorialism’ is also strong in Economics, Sociology, Politics 
and Geography. Stratificatory differentiation is clearly present in the interstate 
domain in the privileges of great powers in interstate society. An interesting 
literature has arisen about the tension between the strong (segmentary) 
legitimacy principle of sovereign equality, versus the prevalent (stratificatory) 
practice of hegemony, which although crucial to international order, lacks any 
accepted legitimating principle (Watson, 1992: 299-309, 319-25; 1997; Clark, 
1989; Hurrell, 2007: 287-98). 
 Moving to the idea that there is any serious functional differentiation at the 
system level would have major implications for what kind of units are in play. It 
would almost certainly require a move away from state-centric models of the 
international system/society towards ones where non-state actors, whether firms 
or civil society associations, and even individuals, have standing as units. This 
points to work from IPE such as Cerny’s, already mentioned, and Stopford and 
Strange (1991); from ‘world society’ thinking in the English school and 
elsewhere which bring both state and non-state actors into the picture (see 
 
 
 
26 
Buzan, 2004: 27-89); and from the globalization literature that points to 
deterritorialization as the principle trend in global politics (Scholte, 2000), and 
a global civil society of nonstate, often transnational, actors (Anheier et al., 
2001). Thinking about more diverse types of entity in international relations 
also opens up another perspective on segmentary differentiation, which is that it 
might apply not just to states as argued above, but to other formations such as 
nations, religions and civilizations that often do not line up with state 
boundaries. In these ways, opening up the system level to functional 
differentiation is a radical move. It raises interesting questions about what the 
whole is that is being differentiated (Albert, 2007), and it shifts attention from 
arguments about what units compose the international system/society, to what 
the underlying structure of society is of which the units are an expression.  
 Yet despite the limited use of functional differentiation in IR, it is far from 
an alien way of thinking. IR is riddled with unconscious usages of functional 
differentiation-like formulations: ‘the international economic system’, 
‘international law’, ‘the international political system’, ‘international society’, 
and indeed the very divisions amongst the disciplines within the social sciences 
reflect a logic of functional differentation indicate thinking in terms of sectoral 
divisions of the subject. Realists from Morgenthau to Waltz talk firmly in terms 
of political theory, assuming that dividing the subject into sectors is a necessary 
condition for effective theory-building, and therefore necessarily, but silently, 
presupposing that some social whole exists from which politics has been 
differentiated. In Security Studies, thinking about security in terms of sectors – 
military, economic, political, societal, environmental – has been around since 
the 1980s and has now become a standard way of organizing texts. All of this 
no doubt indicates a less deep understanding of functional differentiation than 
the division of labour prominent in most sociological theories, but it is 
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nonetheless substantial enough to fuel liberal, IPE, globalizationist, 
Wallersteinian, dependencia, English school, much critical theory, and some 
constructivist rebellions against the state- and politics-centric orthodoxies of 
Realism. Ruggie’s response to Waltz, especially in his linkage of how private 
property and sovereignty defined the transition from medieval to modern can 
also be read as a rejection of an exclusively political understanding of IR. At 
stake here is the meta question for IR theory of what constitutes international 
system/society. Is it states as the dominant unit, and thus segmentary and/or 
stratificatory differentiation? Or has functional/sectoral differentiation 
proceeded sufficiently that international system/society can only be understood 
adequately as comprised by different types of actors interacting across several 
sectors?  
 If functional differentiation is already implicit in IR, what would it look 
like if made more explicit? Specifically, how would functional differentiation at 
the system level play against segmentary and stratificatory differentiation? In 
sociological theory one form of differentiation has to be dominant even though 
all may be present. The process of modernity is understood as having elevated 
functional differentiation to the fore within advanced industrial societies, 
creating the tensions noted above for the decompositionalists who worry that 
this development threatens the shared identity developed in earlier times. Much 
of the discussion about international relations rests on the assumption that 
either segmentary (anarchic) or stratificatory (hegemony-empire) differentiation 
remains the dominant form. This is even the view of Milner (1991) and Cerny 
(1993), who like some globalizationists see functional differentiation only as an 
emergent quality of the international system/sociey, not (yet) as the dominant 
one. Given the absence of a pre-existing society in IR, analysis of functional 
differentiation at the system level cannot follow the decomposition line and 
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must therefore think in terms of emergence. Although the emergence view, as 
noted, can be transposed to IR, in some other ways the subject matter of IR, and 
specifically the issues posed by operating at the international system level, open 
new ground not explored in sociological debates. An emergent functional 
differentiation plays against existing segementary and stratificatory forms, but 
not against a Gemeinschaft society covering the whole system as it would have 
to do in Durkheim’s scheme. Any emergence of functional differentiation at the 
global level would have to play into the Gesellschaft international society 
established by states. 
 Although the mainstream IR view is almost certainly that functional 
differentiation is emergent but not dominant at the system level, Luhmann 
(1982, 1997; see also Stetter, 2008; Albert, Kessler and Stetter, 2008) offers a 
view in which it is. He posits a ‘world society’ composed of subsystems of 
communication each of which is organised around a distinct social function: 
legal, political, economic, scientific, religious and suchlike. In this theory, the 
segmentary and stratificatory differentiations are pushed into the background, 
seen as only having residual importance in the political and legal subsystems 
where territoriality (i.e. segmentary differentiation) still matters. Luhmann 
(1982: 242-5) sees politics as the great survivor of segmentary differentiation 
and, to a lesser degree, class as the survivor of stratificatory differentiation 
within a world society now dominated by functional differentiation. This world 
society is still thought of as a society because, like Durkheim’s organic 
solidarity, it is the logic of functional differentiation itself, and the need for 
each subsystem to adjust to the environment created by the others, that 
composes society. The Luhmannian view is almost certainly too radical to find 
widespread support in IR, both because it dissolves the unit-system distinction, 
and because most people coming from IR would find its marginalization of 
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territoriality and agency implausible. But it does serve as a useful foil for 
anyone wanting to think about what the dominance of functional differentiation 
would look like at the system level. 
 Would functional differentiation break down segmentary by undoing the 
territorial packaging of the state? Or reinforce it by pushing the development of 
more elaborate forms of international society in which states remain the 
principal units, but do so within more open arrangements allowing room and 
rights for a range of non-state actors? Many empirical developments already 
under discussion can be framed in this way: the division of sovereignty in the 
EU’s principle of subsidiarity; the rights given to firms in the state-sanctioned 
move to build a global market economy; the collective pursuit of big science in 
astronomy, space exploration and high energy physics; the emergence of global 
civil society; and the attempt to embed a standard of human rights in 
international society. Would functional differentiation break down 
stratificatory, or transform and reinforce it by making one sector dominant over 
the others? From IR, the idea that contemporary international relations could be 
seen as in transition from the dominance of the military-political sector to the 
economic one was floated by Buzan and Little (2000: 405), and Michael Zürn 
(2007) argues that the global system today resembles a legally stratified multi-
level system of governance. At least the early Luhmann seems to be divided on 
the question, in one place (1982: 238-9) saying that functionally differentiated 
societies ‘cannot be ruled by leading parts or elites as stratified societies (to 
some extent) could be’, and in another (1982: 338) arguing that the primacy of 
politics was displaced by that of economics during the 17th and 18th centuries 
where ‘the economy becomes the leading subsystem of society, because it 
began to define the developmental stage at which society had arrived, and both 
progress and regression began to depend on it’. From Anthropology, Johnson 
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and Earle (2000: 367-90), building on the thinking of Polanyi, also argue for 
the primacy of economics in a functionally stratified world, and similar thinking 
underpins most Marxist approaches. Again, the taxonomy of differentiation 
provides powerful tools for thinking about globalization, an area of IR with 
notoriously weak theoretical foundations. 
 Functional differentiation thus opens a way of thinking that enables many 
different strands of IR theory to be linked together in a framing that puts all of 
them into a single structural context. This potentially integrative solution to the 
problems of a (theoretically) divided discipline can be shown by indicating how 
most of the main theoretical approaches within IR can be related to the 
differentiation taxonomy: 
• Realism gives primacy to segmentary differentiation in its general approach, 
and to stratificatory differentiation in its emphasis on great powers. 
• Liberalism gives primacy to functional differentiation, starting from that 
between the political and economic sectors, but also acknowledges 
segmentary (anarchic structure) and stratificatory (hegemonic stability). 
• Marxism combines functional differentiation (the primacy of economics) 
with stratification (whether in terms of dominant classes, or a more general 
centre-periphery structure of the international system). 
• English school pluralists, like Realists, give primacy to segmentary 
differentiation in their general approach, and to stratificatory differentiation 
in their emphasis on great powers and the forceful expansion of international 
society. Solidarists are more open to adding functional differentiation into 
this mix. 
• Constructivism does not employ assumptions about differentiation, but 
differentiation suggests an interesting starting point for thinking about the 
identities that are of central interest to constructivists. National identity 
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reflects segmentary differentiation; class, caste, hypernationalist and 
imperial-metropolitan identities reflect stratificatory differentiations; and 
layered postmodern identities reflect functional differentiation. 
• Globalization follows liberalism in giving primacy to functional 
differentiation, starting from that between the political and economic sectors 
and adding global civil society. Segmentary and stratificatory differentiation 
are acknowledged in varying degrees, with the former mainly on the way 
out, and the latter, as in Marxism, shifting from arrangements within the 
political sector to a functional primacy of the economic one. 
Viewed in this way, the main strands of IR theory can be seen as reflecting 
different choices about what to emphasise within a single general scheme of 
differentiation. In principle, the systematic application of differentiation theory 
to empirical assessments of the current state of development of the international 
system/society should provide a common basis for judging the relevance claims 
of the different theories. Adoption of a shared differentiation taxonomy could 
also relieve IR of the burden of thinking of itself as composed of 
incommensurable paradigms. Different approaches, certainly, but unrelated and 
mutually exclusive, certainly not. And at least in Durkheim’s model, there is 
even room for both materialist and constructivist approaches to social structure, 
though his scheme gives primacy to the former. 
 Bringing differentiation into IR opens a realm largely unexplored by 
sociologists, and so offers IR the possibility to bring its own expertise, 
particularly on levels of analysis, to the development of the theory itself. 
Nobody has really thought about how differentiation works where first- and 
second-order societies are both in play. It could be argued that IR is principally 
about the study of second-order societies, which makes this obvious territory 
for it to occupy.  
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 Keeping in mind all that has just been said about how to apply the 
taxonomy of differentiation to the layered subject matter of IR, we turn now to 
think about how the sense of history and the forces that allegedly drive the 
evolution of differentiation might be used to rethink how IR understands the 
history of international systems/societies. Recall that differentiation assumes 
general, but not inevitable, evolution up the sequence from segmentary to 
functional. It therefore offers both a social structural framework by which 
history can be benchmarked, and a set of expectations (not determinations) 
about the direction in which things should go provided that the dynamic density 
generated by population and technology is increasing. Because it is mainly a 
forward-looking subject, IR often treats history (other than its own) as a 
Cinderella subject, contenting itself with either event-driven narrative accounts 
of recent history, or selective raids looking for past cases to support or attack 
current theoretical positions. Many Realists find history dull because they see it 
mainly as repetition, and many liberals find it irrelevant because most of what 
they want to talk about happened quite recently. Serious commitment to 
developing a long historical view of international relations is mainly found in 
the English school (Bull and Watson, 1984; Watson, 1992; Buzan and Little, 
2000) and World Systems theory (Wallerstein, 1974, 1984; Gills and Frank, 
1993).6 Because it offers a potential theory of international history, 
differentiation could provide a more general stimulus to IR to develop a 
coherent view of history that links across its main theoretical approaches.  
 Some of the likely benchmarks in such a view might be as follows: 
• Because differentation sets up a link between IR and Anthropology it might 
facilitate a move away from IR’s current practice of thinking about the 
origins of international relations mainly through the imaginings of European 
political theorists such as Hobbes, Kant and Rousseau, to thinking about 
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what actually occurred in prehistory (Buzan and Little, 2000: 111-162). At 
what point did the early stages of differentiation generate units capable of 
having recognizable ‘international relations’, and how were those relations 
affected as the domestic structure of the units moved up from segmentary to 
stratified? 
• The ancient and classical worlds offer a model of international relations in 
which stratificatory differentiation dominated both within the units (kings, 
emperors, slaves) and at the system level (unequal status, empire), across 
several millennia and several distinct international systems. This includes 
even the much-raided IR case of the ancient Greek city states, which, despite 
their standing as the archetype of anarchic (segmentary) international 
relations, were embedded in a larger system/society including the Persian 
Empire. Within this dominance of stratification one also finds elements of 
functional differentiation in the existence of well-institutionalised trade 
diasporas. Because stratificatory differentiation involves unequal access to 
basic resources it requires coercion to sustain it and this suggests that 
stratified units will both concentrate coercive power internally and resort to 
war externally (Fried, 1967:185-230). 
• In the perspective of differentiation, the Medieval period (largely a 
European phenomenon) was both stratified (popes, emperors, the nobility), 
and up to a point functionally differentiated (churches, guilds), yet without 
there being a single authority overall. The Medieval story is important in IR 
because it is the precursor to the Westphalian order that arose in Europe and 
was imposed from there onto the rest of the world (Ruggie, 1983). 
• These characterisations of the ancient and classical, and Medieval worlds 
raise major questions for how differentiation works when it is in play on 
both the domestic and international system/society levels. A two-level game 
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is bound to have quite different dynamics from the single-level model of 
Durkheim. When two levels are in play, it is far from obvious that the 
single-level model of progress up the ladder from segmentary to 
stratificatory to functional differentiation, driven by increasing dynamic 
density, will apply. In post-Medieval Europe, for example, the leading units 
moved internally from stratificatory (absolutism) to functional (modernity) 
differentiation, while the European system became more segmentary 
(sovereign equality). This system/society expanded out into the rest of the 
world in which both units and systems were still largely in stratification 
mode on both levels. European imperialism perpetuated systemic 
stratification in the rest of the world on both levels, while Europe and the 
West became more functionally differentiated domestically, with a 
segmentary international subsystem of their own. Decolonization extended 
segmentary differentiation (sovereign equality) globally at the system level, 
albeit leaving much domestic stratification domestically in the third world, 
and not inconsiderable elements of stratification remaining at the system 
level (the P5 in the UN Security Council, the core-periphery structure of the 
global economy, the hegemony of the West). These patterns suggest that the 
operation of differentiation is considerably more complicated when two 
levels are in play. If IR takes up differentiation, it will have to think through 
these implications, and may find some possibly major opportunities for 
theoretical development within both IR and social theory more widely. 
• The last benchmark is the apparent move from a mainly 
segmentary/stratificatory Westphalian international system to one in which 
functional differentiation is emergent at the global level. As discussed 
above, a key question here is how this development at the system level 
relates to what is going on within states. On the face of it, a case could be 
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made that the push for functional differentiation systemically comes from 
those states where it is most advanced internally, with this in turn creating 
problems for those states whose internal differentiation is less advanced. 
 These benchmarks show how differentation offers a powerful organizing 
principle for studying the history of international systems in a way that links 
together the concerns of many different approaches to IR. They also raise 
questions about how the historical development of international systems relates 
to the driving forces side of differentiation theory. IR is not without its own 
ideas about driving forces though for the most part these remain in the 
background of its debates. Realists stress war (Gilpin, 1981; Howard, 1976; see 
also Tilly, 1990) and more generally changes in the distribution of power. 
Liberals and globalizationists look to changes in the economy and especially 
the rise of interdependence as a structural feature and more autonomous non-
state actors as a unit one. Marxists also start from the economy, but look to 
class conflict, which might be seen as an aspect of stratification. Luhmann 
(1982: 45-51) sees the rise of mass communication, along with functional 
differentiation, as the basis of a single world society. All of these approaches 
are aware of technological advance as a general driver, but all are also 
Eurocentric. Although a thousand years of war might have produced the 
Westphalian state in Europe (Tilly, 1990), it did not do so anywhere else in the 
world. There is a need within IR to think more deeply, and over a longer 
historical stretch, not only about how to benchmark systemic change but also 
about the forces that drive it. The ideas from Sociology and Anthropology 
discussed above about the interplay of population growth and technological 
innovation within environmental constraints as the ‘primary engine’ for the 
evolution of social forms, look like a good place to start such thinking. The 
interplay of Durkheim’s dynamic density with the environmental constraints 
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featured by Anthropologists applies as much to the system level as to the 
domestic one. But although the logic of this ‘engine’ is broadly the same at both 
levels, its impact might well differ because of differences in scale. Other things 
being equal, the increase of dynamic density should push the process of 
differentiation within states faster (because they are small) than at the system 
level (because of the constraints of distance). Yet even here there can be crucial 
exceptions. The central role of ocean-going shipping in world history created a 
significant increase in systemic dynamic density when the units themselves 
were still a long way from being internally integrated. These ideas about 
driving forces are clearly applicable to the early development of international 
relations, and just as clearly applicable to the present, where the environmental 
constraint is now global, and the pressure from population and technology 
immense. However it is labelled, IR needs to pull together its thinking about 
what drives the evolution of international systems/societies, and relate its 
existing ideas to the more basic ones attached to differentiation.  
 
Conclusions 
 
 In this article we have extracted a set of ideas about differentiation derived 
from Sociology and Anthropology. We have shown why this set of ideas has so 
far not been given much consideration within IR, and how and why the one 
encounter between IR and Sociology that might have changed this failed to do 
so. We have set out in some detail how differentiation bears on the subject 
matter of IR, how it adds a radical third dimension to IR debates about 
structure, and how it offers a general framing within which much of IR theory 
can be located, and possibly integrated. We have argued that this set of ideas 
offers new ways of looking at the subject matter of IR, and new insights into it. 
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Our aims have been to set out a general rationale for bringing differentiation 
into IR theory debates, and to show some of the main things that might be done 
with it. We think that differentiation offers to IR a major possibility for 
theoretical development. What is handed on from Anthropology and Sociology 
is mainly designed for smaller, less layered subject matters than that of IR. In 
adapting differentiation to its larger scale, more layered subject matter, IR can 
develop it into something new and more powerful for social theory as a whole. 
This is an opportunity not only for IR to strengthen its own theoretical 
apparatus, but also to make much more of a splash among other social sciences 
than it has done so far. 
 
___________________________________________________ 
Notes 
1. There is an ambiguity in Luhmann (and quite a debate) on whether ‘centre-periphery’ is a form of differentiation 
on the same scale as segmentary, stratificatory, and functional differentiation. We do not have the space to engage 
with this discussion here, but want to point out that when Luhmann refers to this form of differentiation under the 
condition of a primacy of functional differentiation, he does not mean it in a geographic sense at all, but refers to the 
centre and the periphery of function systems (so that, for example, a court decision would certainly belong to the 
centre of the legal system, whereas the legal relation underlying the purchase of a pint in a local pub would be more 
on the periphery). 
2. For an extensive discussion see Donnelly (2009). It should be noted here as well that Immanuel Wallerstein 
frequently describes the modern world-system explicitly in terms of stratification (although he does reject the 
notions of ‘First’ and ‘Third’ World). 
3. The legitimacy (and thus also the stability) seems to be directly related to the degree to which a stratified order is 
differentiated into various strata. As Luhmann (1997: 613; translation BB/MA) notes: ‘This form [stratification; 
BB/MA] also has its basic structure in a binary distinction, namely that between nobility and the common people. In 
this form it would however be relatively unstable as it could be reversed easily. Stable hierarchies such as the Indian 
caste system or the late-medieval society of estates thus produce, in whatever artificial way, at least three different 
levels in order to create the impression of stability’. 
4. This is not to deny that in addition to viewing the political sector as functionally differentiated from other sectors 
one could argue that it is also functionally differentiated internally; see Albert (2002) for a book-length elaboration 
on this issue. 
5. Donnelly (2009) also seeks to break away from anarchy-hierarchy, and his exceedingly complicated scheme does 
in places move beyond the political sector. 
6. A noteworthy exception is Deudney (2007). 
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